Classifying states : instrumental rhetoric or a compelling normative theory? by Coakley, Mathew
  
 
 
 
  warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Coakley, Mathew. (2017) Classifying states : instrumental rhetoric or a compelling normative 
theory? Ethics and Global Politics, 10 (1). pp. 58-76. 
 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/89069  
 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. 
 
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
license (CC BY 4.0) and may be reused according to the conditions of the license.  For more 
details see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/   
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version, or, version of record, and may be 
cited as it appears here. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=zegp20
Ethics & Global Politics
ISSN: 1654-4951 (Print) 1654-6369 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/zegp20
Classifying states: instrumental rhetoric or a
compelling normative theory?
Mathew Coakley & Pietro Maffettone
To cite this article: Mathew Coakley & Pietro Maffettone (2017) Classifying states: instrumental
rhetoric or a compelling normative theory?, Ethics & Global Politics, 10:1, 58-76, DOI:
10.1080/16544951.2017.1341793
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2017.1341793
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 07 Jul 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 266
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Classifying states: instrumental rhetoric or a compelling
normative theory?
Mathew Coakleya and Pietro Maﬀettoneb
aPolitics and International Studies, Warwick University, Coventry, U.K; bLecturer in Global Politics and
Ethics, School of Government and International Aﬀairs, Durham University, Durham, U.K
ABSTRACT
Many states use a classiﬁcatory approach to foreign policy: they put
other states into particular categories and structure their engagement
and relations partly as a result. There is one prominent modern inter-
national political theory – Rawls’ Law of Peoples – that seems to adopt
this approach as an account of justiﬁed state behaviour. But should we
expect this type of theory ultimately to prove attractive, justiﬁed and
philosophically distinct compared to more instrumentalist rivals? This
paper explores the challenges generic to any such account, not merely
those relating to Rawls’ speciﬁc version, and surveys possible responses
and their shortcomings.
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Many modern states appear to rely on a ‘classiﬁcatory approach’ to their foreign policy
making,1 namely they identify other states as belonging to various categories – those respect-
ing human rights, non-aggressors, dictatorships, democracies, allies, trade partners, ‘friendly’
autocracies, and many more2 – and use membership of such categories to structure how they
approach a very wide range of interstate interactions. But does it actually make sense –
normatively and conceptually speaking – to have a foreign policy that is guided by such
classiﬁcations?3
While the practice of classifying states as a way to structure foreign policy relations is
reasonably widespread (Herrmann & Fischerkeller 1995), very few appraisals of the
general approach exist in the global justice literature or in international ethics more
broadly.4 Furthermore, the few appraisals that do actually appear in the literature are
centred on the question of how to operationalize state classiﬁcationism in a normatively
credible way and have left the conceptual presuppositions of the approach largely
CONTACT Pietro Maﬀettone pietro.maﬀettone@durham.ac.uk Department of Politics and International
Relations, Warwick University, U.K.
1We’re very grateful for comments from the two anonymous reviewers and the editors. The authors would also like to
thank Carly Beckerman, Peter Jones, Erin Nash, Andrew Walton and John Williams for comments.
2For an excellent overview see (Hudson 2005).
3Readers familiar with the global justice literature will immediately relate this question to that of collective responsi-
bility: see, for example, Miller (2007). Yet, while the two topics may be coterminous under some theories, they need
not be. Members of a given political community need not necessarily be held responsible for how their state behaves
internally and externally: the content of a foreign policy can be wholly directed at the governement of a state, or at
its ruling elite or at diﬀerent apsects of state institutions.
4On some of the issues related to operationalizing a speciﬁc version see Forster (2014) and Doyle (2006).
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unaddressed. This paper aims to ﬁll this theoretical gap by surveying the main chal-
lenges ‘state classiﬁcationism’ would face if it is to be a conceptually plausible and
philosophically distinct theory of justiﬁed international engagement. To be very, very,
very clear: the question being examined here is not one in empirical comparative
politics or international relations – it is not the question of how states actually behave
and whether we can model such behaviour using state-classiﬁcations. This a relevant
concern – as discussed subsequently – because it gives us reason to think that state
classiﬁcationism as an approach has appeal to key real-world actors. But the question
we are asking is diﬀerent in kind, and the huge literature looking at how states actually
behave does not answer it. What we want to explore is whether the practice of
classifying states can be theoretically justiﬁed as an attractive and distinct approach to
international state-behaviour ethics without collapsing into well-known alternatives.
Furthermore, the value of discussing the approach’s strengths and weaknesses in
principle may also provide some clarity on the abuse of it in practice. Clearly existing
states do classify other states for ideological reasons and for the pursuit of self-interest,
this being done with categories that are sometimes unreﬂectively inﬂuenced by power
imbalances and elite norms.5 It would be helpful as such to know if the entire approach
should be discounted or not, even if we recognize that it can be abused.
Within normative political philosophy, Rawls’ (1999) The Law of Peoples (hereafter LP)
potentially lends itself to be described as a form of state classiﬁcationism. How best to
conceive of this work is an important issue, but to the extent possible we will try to be
agnostic on this; thus the status of LPwill vary depending on the reader’s judgement. If they
think it straightforwardly provides state or polity based conditions that determine a justiﬁed
foreign policy, it will serve as a direct example. Alternatively, if the reader judges it as
providing an ideal theory in which diﬀerent kinds of political communities are conceptua-
lized as elements of a constructivist approach to the justiﬁcation of a conception of
international justice, then it will serve as a referent, albeit one that may vary when applied.
Furthermore, though we use the theory as an illustration, the overall argument doesn’t
depend on the very speciﬁc suggestions Rawls makes.
Thus one way to view the task of this paper is by the following thought experiment:
imagine Rawls had proposed a diﬀerent classiﬁcation of political communities, one that
nonetheless did not collapse into an instrumentalist, or some form of consequentialist,
theory. Clearly, much of the criticism of his (counterfactual) proposal would be
diﬀerent to the criticism he did face. But some types of problems might be common
to any reasonably compelling version of such a theory. This is our focus here.
The ﬁrst part of this paper tries to produce a sympathetic reconstruction of the
underlying assumptions that guide such classiﬁcations, notably relying on the idea that
we can classify political communities given some of their ‘deﬁning features’. We then go
on to show that, despite the use of such classiﬁcations appearing to be quite widespread,
the approach in general suﬀers from a number of underlying structural conceptual
diﬃculties, with the two most signiﬁcant being: (a) completeness – that categories often
comprise multiple criteria that need not correlate and often do not correlate, and as
such do not necessarily yield threshold evaluations (that a state can be rightly regarded
5See here, for instance, Teti (2012) on post-democratization discourse, or Giannone (2010) on the ideological inﬂuences
on the state rankings provided by Freedom House.
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as a certain ‘type’ because it ﬁts the features of that type); and (b) gradation – that
adherence to categories is often by matter of degree not by the presence of a discrete
feature.
We assess these objections and suggest that there are at least potential solutions or
modiﬁcations that would blunt the aforementioned diﬃculties. The completeness
problem can in principle be addressed by using some sort of lexical ordering of the
moral principles underlying international relations, though the question of how to
justify the precise ranking philosophically is a diﬃcult one. And, in theory at least, if
a state’s divergent evaluations are based on its behaviour in diﬀerent ‘realms’ then this
might be addressed by having diﬀerent spheres of engagement – that is, a polity might
have a close relationship with another state in one sphere, and an antagonistic relation-
ship with it in another. The gradation problem could in theory be overcome by
replacing threshold conditions with judgements based on family resemblances or
‘distance’ to various ideal types.
We conclude, however, by noting that, while in principle addressing the diﬃculties,
there are possible downsides concerning the reformulated approach’s ability to be both
theoretically compelling and realistically action guiding. The lexical solution notably
generates a problem of ‘mixed-incentives’, namely that other states will face incentives
to make small improvements in lexically decisive criteria even if causing a major
worsening on some lower-ranked criteria – opening one’s economy to international
trade (say) may apparently ‘excuse’ widespread human rights violations or a crack-
down on domestic dissent. The ‘multiple realms’ solution risks rendering foreign policy
decidedly, and possibly unsustainably, ‘schizophrenic’ – being allies in some areas and
strong antagonists in others is hard to maintain given the type of multi-area bargaining
and engagement that characterizes state relations. Finally, the ‘ideal types’ approach to
resolve the gradation problem could generate divergent assessments given its reliance
on judgment rather than more clearly identiﬁable threshold evaluations. If the goal of
the state classiﬁcation approach is to act as a normative guide to foreign policy
behaviour in the real world then the aforementioned problems would ultimately need
to be addressed.
In short: while almost everyone engaged in it recognizes that accurately classifying states
involves diﬃcult empirical questions (is someone really respecting human rights, are their
democratic procedures really robust?), the whole approach also brings with it diﬃcult
normative choices, despite its apparent widespread use and genuine appeal to a great many
people.
The existing literature on this topic mainly falls into two categories: discussions of
Rawls’ particular proposals in LP; and examinations of the descriptive aspects of state
classiﬁcation as practiced by foreign policy actors. The goal of this paper is to draw
upon but equally step back from these debates and ask the broader question: is state
classiﬁcationism plausible as a distinct general normative approach? If so, what pro-
blems will any such account have to overcome, and how optimistic should we be that it
will succeed?6
6Of the two authors, one is reasonably skeptical of the likelihood of success, the other cautiously optimistic. We both
agree however that such judgements can only be justiﬁed if we have a clear sense of the approach’s challenges and
resources.
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State classiﬁcation: real-world practice
From the perspective of normative theory, discussions of the ‘state categorization’
approach to foreign policy making have gained prominence most signiﬁcantly following
Rawls’s LP and several subsequent extended discussions and critiques (a very good
overview is Williams 2010, and for some of the canonical criticisms see Pogge 1994;
Buchanan 2000; Beitz 2000; Caney 2002; and Shue 2002; with Wenar 2006 and Reidy
2007 oﬀering some replies).7 Some will immediately resist the idea that LP can reason-
ably be considered as a form of state classiﬁcationism. They will point out that LP is a
realistic utopia (1999, 11), to use Rawls’ expression, that the eight principles of LP and
the companion idea of well-ordered peoples are part of ideal theory (1999, 4–5), and
that Rawls explicitly rejects the use of the term ‘states’ (1999, 23–30) precisely because
he wants to avoid relying on agents that mirror the actual behaviour of political
communities in the international system.
In line with what has been argued above, our reply is deﬂationary. First, let us
assume that the aforementioned understanding of Rawls is the correct one. Even if so,
the basic project of this paper is not aﬀected. LP is a (putative) illustration of the idea of
state classiﬁcationism – its cogency (as an illustration) does not settle the question of
whether the approach is itself cogent (the focus of our discussion). Furthermore, even if
LP is a pure ideal theory, it will need to be somehow applied, and that might necessitate
some form of state classiﬁcationism (see notably Doyle 2006; Forster 2014).
In a similar way, note that some have criticized Rawls’ LP for using an excessively
‘rigid’ theoretical framework (see for example Caney 2002, 104, but also; Shue 2002). A
theory that wants to be ‘Realistically Utopian’ (1999, 5–7) and of use as a guide to the
foreign policy of liberal democratic regimes (1999, 8, 83), cannot be grounded in
categorical distinctions ill-beﬁtting the complexity of international politics. Yet, such
criticisms often seem to rely on the assumption that applying LP’s framework would
necessarily fall prey to what we describe below as the gradation and completeness
problems (Caney 2002, 105). Hence it matters whether these concerns can be defused
by reconceptualizing the way in which state classiﬁcations are approached.
Second, whatever the ‘right’ interpretation of Rawls, the broader approach is worth
taking seriously because of a perhaps less-appreciated fact: that this is plausibly how
signiﬁcant numbers of powerful state actors approach the problem.
Indeed, there has been a steadily expanding body of research, going back to at least
the 1960s, whereby foreign policy scholars, in attempting to understand how states
construct their foreign policy, have looked to the type of representations that leaders
and elites (which are often considered the prime movers of policy formation within
state bureaucracies) have of their own polity and of those with whom they interact on
the international scene (Hudson 2007). This approach now has a lot of nuance to it, but
the general idea, broadly stated, is that states form both self- and other-oriented role
representations and these ‘self-conceptions’ or ‘images’ are then used to structure and
orientate a state’s interaction with other states.
Such classiﬁcations can be relatively rich – witness, for example, an early classic in
this literature, Holsti’s National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy (1970),
7For more recent discussions of the implications of Rawls’ work for international theory and practice see (Williams 2011;
Riker 2014, 2009; Neufeld 2013; Reinhardt 2012; Forster 2014; Lister 2012; Eckert 2015).
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which identiﬁes close to 20 diﬀerent main ways in which countries can perceive their
role in international society, ranging from ‘bastion of revolution’, to ‘defender of the
faith’.8 What matters for present purposes, however, is that this now quite large
literature is premised on the extensive evidence that many state actors do seem to use
the qualitative classiﬁcation of other states (and their own) as a signiﬁcant guide to their
foreign policy.
So why not simply use the way inﬂuential state actors classify states in the real world
as the ‘correct’ way of conducting state classiﬁcations? Well, for two reasons: one
pragmatic, one more fundamental. First, inﬂuential actors have mixed incentives and
so may not apply the categories consistently or in line with what their judgements
might be absent self-interested considerations. Take, for instance, the U.S.’s use of
‘rogue state’, a term relied upon in structuring foreign relations by the White House,
the Pentagon, and the Department of State of several diﬀerent administrations (see
Hoyt 2000; O’Reilly 2007).9 It’s then possible to use such designations to identify
statistically the policy dimensions that typically trigger ‘rogue status’: (a) the attempt
to develop weapons of mass destruction; (b) involvement with terrorism; (c) posing a
military threat; and d) challenging international norms (Hoyt 2000, 303).
However, clearly this does not fully explain the actual classiﬁcatory choices made by
the U.S. government: though both India and Pakistan, for instance, have developed
nuclear programs in open violation of international norms, they are not oﬃcially
considered as potential rogues (O’Reilly 2007, 302–4). Even if partly adopting the
‘state classiﬁcation’ approach, the U.S. does so with a certain degree of inconsistency,
to say the least. States may also simply be cynically using the categories as a justiﬁcatory
veneer for pre-determined behaviour.
Second, however, and most importantly from a normative theorist’s perspective, we
want to know how these categories should be justiﬁably applied and structured, and
what actions this should guide. The fact that many state actors adopt the broad
approach seems to elevate it to the status of ‘the sort of approach that can be
implemented in the real world’ and as such raises the question of this paper – is
there a variant that has real-world utility and can still be normatively both distinct
and justiﬁed. Empirical practice cannot settle the latter question.
State classiﬁcation: normative requirements
Clearly, a classiﬁcatory-based foreign policy is attractive to many, and seems to be part
of the way a large number of states approach foreign policy making. Yet for any theory
endorsing this to represent a distinct normative account it has, crucially, not simply to
collapse into the following, very well-theorized, view:
Foreign-Policy Reductivism (F.P.R.): Any set of principles by which we classify states and
use to guide foreign policy are all ultimately justiﬁed by reference to one underlying value
or combined scalar metric.
8A more recent updated elaboration of the approach is Krotz (2002), notably where how states classify themselves is
argued to be an important determinant of foreign policy behaviour.
9It’s often wrongly believed that this is simply an outgrowth of the Bush Administration’s ‘war on terror’ but, in fact, it
predates it. See, for example, Miles (2013 ch. 1 and ch. 2).
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This, of course, is plainly the case for utilitarians and for most consequentialists generally,
though the approach in practice need not at all always require the naïve direct pursuit of a
single goal, potentially involving the use of principles as rules-of-thumb with allied
dispositions (Hooker 2000), as self-commitment devices (Elster 1979), and as coordina-
tion tools or epistemic shortcuts (Hardin 1988). F.P.R. also captures the position of a
range of nationalists or those advocating national self-interest as the supreme test of
policies, and for that matter those aimed at perpetuating stable rule by the current
executive. This also could be a coherent position of a range of libertarian positions
where the underlying value was liberty as some sort of non-interference or non-
coercion (Lomasky 2001).
Ultimately though, when F.P.R. adopts a set of principles to classify states these hinge for
their justiﬁcation on the empirical question of whether adopting the principles promotes
the underlying value (be it overall utility, welfare, peace, stable rule, liberty, or whatever). As
such, while F.P.R. is clearly one way of classifying states according to some of their deﬁning
features, it doesn’t exhaust the approach as a whole and, if it were the only justiﬁable type of
theory, the classiﬁcatory approach would lose its normative distinctiveness.
What is it to be normatively distinct to reductionist approaches? Two theories are
normatively distinct, in the sense used here, to the extent that they disagree on two
dimensions: (i) the type of factors that determine ethical evaluations and (ii) the content
of these factors. To give an example, a deontological theory will be signiﬁcantly
normatively distinct to a consequentialist one – disagreeing on both criteria – whereas
consequentialist theories typically disagree on the latter only (with exceptions). Thus
when it comes to foreign policy, to be normatively distinct is to make such judgements
on grounds that don’t ultimately collapse into an instrumental metric. To avoid this, it
needs to adopt some variant of the following:
Foreign Policy Non-Reductivism (F.P.N.R.): The principles by which we classify states and
decide foreign policy thereof are not themselves reducible to one underlying value or
combined scalar metric.
The question philosophically, however, is how to set out and justify such an approach so that it
doesn’t ultimately collapse into a single-value or single-metric reductivist view. Why does
identifying normatively distinct approachesmatter?Well, for twomain reasons. First, because
identifying distinct approaches helps us be clear on the sources of disagreement. For foreign
policy reductivists there are two, and only two, possible sources of disagreement: (a) what the
underlying value should be; and (b) the empirical question of how actions aﬀect the pursuit of
(a). For non-reductivists there are minimally three: (a) what the diﬀerent non-collapsible
underlying values should be; (b) how conﬂicts between these values should be resolved; and
(c) the empirical question of how actions aﬀect the pursuit of (a) and (b). If we can work out
which approach is better justiﬁed we can gain, in the process, a better understanding of the
potential sources of disagreement (and convergence) between possible theories.
Second, because F.P.N.R. captures, relatively straightforwardly, the way many reﬂec-
tive individuals talk and approach foreign policy, speciﬁcally capturing the intuition
that certain principles cannot be ‘traded’; that, say, economic growth, human rights
protection, territorial sovereignty and democratic governance draw upon diﬀerent
ideals and cannot, ultimately, be simply justiﬁed by reference to welfare (or well-
being, or whatever the underlying metric). Foreign Policy Non-Reductivism, unlike
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its conceptual rival, could for instance justify the sense that there is something decid-
edly distasteful about condoning widespread human rights violations if doing so yields
a suﬃciently higher probability of a growth-enhancing trade relationship.10 Put in a
slightly diﬀerent way, F.P.N.R. is in line with many people’s considered convictions
about the non-tradability of some moral values, and thus it is important, for those
committed to achieving reﬂective equilibrium, to explore whether a form of state
classiﬁcationism based on F.P.N.R. is normatively and conceptually plausible.
Some may immediately object11 that the negative appearance of F.P.R. might be reduced
by the underlying value being suitably noble – such as, for example, world peace. This is true,
but only to an extent.While it’s certainly the case that how ‘distasteful’ a single-value theory is
will depend on the content of that value, there still seems to be something troubling about
seeing the world in that way. Caring only about world peace – and not also about, say, liberty
and human health – would seem to many as ignoring morally important interests (with this
depending crucially on how encompassing the value is). Furthermore, note that, often, these
‘ecompassing values’ are internally complex and that their speciﬁcation tends to uncover
particular conditions that contribute to make their realization worthwile. To illustrate, ‘world
peace’ is underdetermined: it can be modelled along the lines of a ‘pax Romana’ or according
to a Kantian ‘feudum paciﬁcum’. Not only would these two conceptions of world peace be
diﬀerent, but what makes the secondmore attractive is precisely the fact that its attainment is
made conditional on other values (e.g. mutual recognition between political communities)
that are conceptually distinct and morally defensible on their own terms.
How then might F.P.N.R. be diﬀerent in practice? The most plausible option here
appears to be to appeal to certain ‘deﬁning features’ which express a series of values that
themselves are not reducible to a single metric. (Why is this the most plausible option?
Well, the demonstration is by counter-positive: assume that the values underlying these
distinct categories are the same or can be compared by certain weights – in that case we
have implicitly adopted a single metric representing the underlying weighting or under-
lying ideal. Hence we must have a theory-structure where this doesn’t hold.)
And indeed, it’s no coincidence that Rawls’ LP – arguably the only fully spelled out
systematic (normative) theory of F.P.N.R. – does exactly this: it sets out the deﬁning
features of various political structures and behaviors, and uses these to determine justiﬁed
international ethical behaviour.
Rawls uses the term ‘peoples’ to describe what he calls liberal and decent political
communities with three further images, namely, burdened societies, benevolent absolut-
isms and outlaw states, with these categories based on how these agents behave in various
‘realms’ (domestic political aﬀairs, the amount of social and political capital, interstate
conﬂict, adherence to various international norms and behaviours).12What is relevant here
is that the classiﬁcations then partly determine liberal peoples’ justiﬁed foreign policy
stance. Decent peoples should be tolerated as equal members in good standing of what
10And the distaste here is not really addressed by hoping all-good-things ultimately go together, that for instance
protesting human rights abuses will always lead to better growth-enhancing governance. It might; but it might not.
11We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for encouraging us to address this particular objection.
12Some will object that we are forgetting the role of the LP’s eight principles: Aren’t they what guide foreign policy
behaviour for Rawls? Of course they are relevant, but (i) the principles are ‘selected’ after Rawls has described the
main features of the parties (including their basic interests) to the ﬁrst international orginal position (i.e. liberal
peoples) and (ii) the principles themeselves specify constraints for membership in the Society of Peoples, but do not
provide a full account of foreign policy.
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Rawls calls the Society of Peoples; burdened societies should be helped through a duty of
assistance to become well-ordered; benevolent absolutisms – though mostly neglected in
LP – are to be considered as sovereign over their people and territory given that they respect
human rights and are externally peaceful; and, ﬁnally, outlaw states should be the object of
coercive measures, ranging from sanctions to military intervention.
What Rawls can be thought to provide, then, is an approach to state classiﬁcation that
doesn’t collapse into an instrumental metric13 (such as, for example, consequentialist
accounts), and isn’t undermined by the observation that in practice states often classify
other states in amuchmoremessy and inconsistentmanner than their oﬃcial rhetoric claims.
The approach in general is attractive, it seems to capture a standard that states are (imper-
fectly) aiming for, and arguably coheres well withmany people’s considered judgements. This
does not mean, however, that F.P.N.R. lacks philosophical and empirical problems.
Problems: completeness and gradation
Rawls’ approach to international ethics is a potential variant of F.P.N.R. and as such is
useful for illustrating its broader problems, in particular those relating to the degree of
rigidity in the classiﬁcatory criteria and to the real-world implications that such rigidity
could potentially have.
First, note how Rawls seems to describe political communities through a set of necessary
criteria. For example, a liberal people is such if: (i) it is organized on the model of a
constitutional democracy; (ii) its citizens are united by ‘common sympathies’; and (iii) it
has a moral nature (1999, 23–4). As such, if any of the aforementioned conditions is not met,
one should conclude that the object in question is not a liberal people. However, this would
seem to create the apparent paradox that, for example, a political community institutionally
organized as a constitutional democracy might not be considered a liberal people in the
absence of, say, common sympathies sharedby its citizens.14We are entitled to ask the broader
question: what if a state does not meet one of the conditions that deﬁne it as a speciﬁc object
(i.e. type of people), but meets all the other relevant conditions?15 Sometimes, admittedly, it
might be that failing one or some of the standards for membership of the relevant type can
ipso facto push a people in a diﬀerent group: for example, sticking to Rawls’ categories for
purposes of illustration, a benevolent absolutism16 that is externally aggressive may simply
become an outlaw state. However, this need not be the case for all relevant standards. Once
again, consider a political community that only protects a subset of the basic liberal constitu-
tional freedoms, or one that has a deeply liberal and secular value system but only an
insuﬃcient commitment to democratic voting mechanisms and procedures. How are we to
classify it?
13There is a possible interpretation of LP that sees it as purely instrumentalist – such as to world peace. Neither author
thinks this is the best interpretation, but if the reader accepts it then the references to LP throughout should be
interpreted as referring to a hypothetical alternative where the justiﬁcation was not meant as purely instrumentalist
in the sense previously discussed.
14This is not as unlikely as might be initially thought. Many liberal democratic states in the real world contain more
than one people (and thus, one might conjecture, more than one set of ‘common sympathies’ within the same
institutional structure).
15Here we follow and expand on (Caney 2002, 104).
16Rawls deﬁnes benevolent absolutisms as political communities that respect the basic rights of their members, are
externally peaceful, but fail to provide any meaningful form of political participation mechanisms to their citizens. See
Rawls (1999, 90).
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We can call this the completeness problem; namely, that even if we think of the
relevant set of standards that comprise a state-classiﬁcation as each being capable of
being met or not, then it’s still the case that a state might meet some and not others.
This raises the pressing problem of how to classify a state when this happens.
As an example of the completeness problem consider China and the realm of human
rights. Imagine, for the purposes of this example, that one is committed to a version of
F.P.N.R. where respect for a clear set of basic human rights is central to determine the
classiﬁcation of a state. The Chinese state has what is widely regarded as a remarkably
bad record on human rights (Foot 2000). If one were to focus on political rights, then
China appears to have a sustained and well-thought through institutional apparatus the
eﬀect of which is to actively repress the political rights of its members. However, the
latter picture is severely complicated by the fact that China’s bureaucracy is also
responsible for what is, according to many, potentially the largest successful exercise
in lifting people out of desperate poverty in the history of humankind.17 In so doing,
the Chinese government can be credited with preventing a dramatically large amount of
human suﬀering (and consequently credited for the partial fulﬁlment of a central class
of basic human rights, namely, what Shue (1980) famously called subsistence rights).18
Thus when it comes to human rights, how do we classify China? To classify it simply as
an ‘outlaw state’ would be reductive of the complexity of the case in hand.
Now, one thought here might be that, in practice, states with poor behaviour on some
human rights are likely to have poor behaviour on other such rights, so we might still have
mostly complete classiﬁcations in this realm. This seems empirically plausible at least; but,
as an observation, it understates the broader diﬃculties, for while many states do often have
reasonably consistently good /bad /mediocre stances within a particular realm (e.g. domes-
tic human rights, economic development and institutions, political structures, respect for
borders, international cooperation, etc.) there is frequently really stark variance between
realms. There are states that are peaceable and corrupt (Morocco),19 those that are demo-
cratic yet seem to be constantly engaged in non-internationally authorized military action
in other states (such as the U.S.A.), those that are highly economically developed but stiﬂe
dissent (such as Singapore),20 and so on.
What these examples illustrate is that the completeness problem is likely to apply to a
vast array of classiﬁcatory exercises based on widely accepted values such as external
peacefulness, well-functioning internal institutions, and the representative character of
government. More speciﬁcally, any criteria for classifying states will most plausibly
cover diﬀerent realms of activity and types of institution and, as a result, we should
expect a failure of completeness to be very common. While conceptually this is still an
issue of completeness, it deserves highlighting as the most empirically likely manifesta-
tion of this problem (call it, perhaps, the ‘diﬀerent realms case’); namely, if the criteria
17For an extended analysis of the complex and multifaceted reception of human rights norms in China see
Peerenboorm (2005) and Svensson (2002).
18This example relies on accepting subsistence rights as key human rights, but the overall point can be applied to any
such multiple-rights conception. In other words, nothing hinges on which rights one sees as human rights. Whatever
the answer to that question it is possible to construct an alternative example that illustrates the same problem.
19For a useful international contextualization of Morocco’s problems with corruption see https://www.transparency.org/
cpi2014/results. Nothing hinges on accepting the validity of the classiﬁcations provided by transparency international.
20See, for instance, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/singapore. As with footnote 19, nothing in
the argument hinges on accepting this speciﬁc illustrative case.
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used to classify a state pertain to more than one realm (e.g. external peacefulness and
respect for basic human rights at home), and, as is often the case, state behaviour varies
very signiﬁcantly between those realms (e.g. a state violates basic rights but is largely
externally peaceful), then we will likely end up with a ‘mixed’ classiﬁcation.
Second, as well as states often meeting some criteria and not others, it also seems
usually to be the case in practice that most of the obvious criteria used to classify states
can be met to diﬀerent degrees.21 It’s not that there are simply some states which violate
human rights and others which do not – many political communities violate some
human rights, respect other human rights, and do a ‘half-baked’ job on yet more. The
case of existing liberal democracies is particularly striking in this respect, at least if one
adopts the Rawlsian framework in LP: given what Rawls considers to be a liberal people,
the chances of an actual political community fully meeting these requirements are low,
bordering the non-existent (see Doyle 2015).
Note, furthermore, that the issue here is not about the interpretation of the criteria
and the diﬃculties don’t merely stem from the uncertainty and perhaps indeterminacy
inherent in general moral and political principles. It’s true, for example, that diﬀerent
conceptions of human rights may individuate diﬀerent central classes of such rights as a
function of their diﬀering philosophical groundings.22 Yet, even if there was complete
agreement on the content of the criteria, the problem would still stand insofar as
meeting the criteria in question is often a matter of degrees. Call this the gradation
problem; namely, that in a particular realm any standards or criteria may be met to a
certain extent, not placing a state cleanly in one category or another.
As an example of the gradation problem consider the U.S.A. Here, for purposes of
illustration, consider also a state classiﬁcation approach in which the securing of a wide
range of political and economic rights is central to being considered a liberal state.
Other than exceptionally creative judgments, the U.S.A. is usually seen as a liberal
democracy: most rights from the constitutional tradition are guaranteed, its citizens
share at least some common sympathies, and the constitution requires that the political
system should be organized on the model of a representative democracy. However, it is
also fair to say that the U.S. political system does not guarantee the full array of basic
subsistence rights of all its members,23 while the role of capital in the political process
does not seem to aﬀord ‘fair value’ to the political liberties for all citizens (Bartels 2008).
It secures some rights fully, some partially. How, then, do we classify the U.S.A.?24
21Once again we follow and expand on Caney (2002).
22Witness, say, the diﬀerence between traditional views such as those of Griﬃn (2008) and so-called political
approaches such asthose of Beitz (2010).
23For a classic, and in many respects unsurpassed, analysis of the deﬁciencies of the American health care system, and
the importanc of health provisions for basic justice, see Daniels (1985).
24Again, it’s possible to argue with the contemporary case, but we can instead think of the U.S.A.’s history of civil rights
progress: it seems plausible that there wasn’t any single moment when it became a full liberal democracy but, rather,
that there was a series of partial improvements on access to the franchise, protection from egregious race-based state
violence, and a somewhat weakening of institutional discrimination. Even if one (controversially) thinks that the U.S.
A. does currently fully meet all the relevant criteria, there was clearly a point in time where it met very few of them,
and many points in-between where they were partially met. The same would presumably be true of the history of
almost all countries currently described as liberal democracies (European states with histories of colonialism, for
instance, would have been historically evaluated in a very mixed manner). Gradation, in other words, can be taken to
be both a synchronic and/or diachronic problem, and even those conﬁdent that all modern developed democracies
are fully liberal would have to concede that this was not always the case, and may not be the case for various states
in transition in the future.
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The completeness problem and gradation problem are importantly diﬀerent. The
completeness problem arises because if we have some set of thresholds to meet a
classiﬁcation in a particular realm (such as domestic aﬀairs or trade or respect for
international norms etc.) then it is possible that a state might meet some and not others,
and it is likely that there will be quite a few states that meet the criteria in one realm
and fail them in another (the diﬀerent realms case). The gradation problem is that in
the real world states often only meet a threshold to a certain degree or in a fractured
manner. That is, schematically, if meeting an ‘A’ classiﬁcation requires doing/being a1,
a2 and a3:
(i) One state could, for example, meet a1 and a2 but not a3 (a problem of
completeness); and
(ii) One state could meet a1 fully, a2 partially, and a3 weakly (a problem of
gradation).
While these seem like abstract problems, they are not diﬃculties anyone sympa-
thetic to the approach should happily leave unresolved, for one of the distinctive
features of state classiﬁcationism is that it should be able to provide (indirectly, at
the very least) actual guidance with respect to the attitudes and foreign policy
engagement of a given state with respect to the international community and
foreign polities. Rawls’ work on international ethics, for example, promises to be a
normatively salient guide to the foreign policy of existing liberal democratic peoples.
However, if the latter promise is to be kept, any framework that relies on ‘deﬁning
features’, given the problems of completeness and gradation, will need to be adapted
at least to some extent.
This action-guidance also helps highlight the scope of these challenges – for
example, do they apply to all such classiﬁcations, such as that of Freedom House
or of the Democracy Index? This depends on how the classiﬁcations are normatively
used, because there are two diﬀerent options here: one, as a way of summarizing
some data; or, two, as an implied basis for deciding upon foreign policy. Oﬃcially
both indexes are only the ﬁrst, but they are sometime framed implicitly as
the second, and so serve as a useful example. Strictly speaking, though, it is only
classiﬁcations which then partly determine foreign policy actions that count as an
example of the normative approach being discussed. Hence, the focus on foreign
policy guidance.
One ﬁnal matter of note. A reviewer has suggested that the extent of these
diﬃculties should in principle depend on the number of variables or deﬁning
features. This seems to us an important observation and a potential practical
argument for theoretical parsimony, since the theory here is meant to be also
action guiding.
Some answers: counting principles and ideal types
Section four took the most obvious and straightforward theory structure of state
classiﬁcationism – that where categories have a set of deﬁning features, the structure
is indeed that which Rawls seems to adopt – and raised a series of problems any such
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theory seems likely to encounter. In what follows we discuss some possible changes that
in principle could overcome the diﬃculties, and in the subsequent section we note a few
of the downsides each of these brings.
The ﬁrst sympathetic change is directed at the completeness problem, which, recall,
is that objects of classiﬁcation deﬁned by a set of necessary conditions may only meet
some of the relevant criteria and thus not fall into any one camp. However, note that
this arises due to a speciﬁc way of conceiving of the deﬁnition of the categories. One
could hold instead that states should be classiﬁed through some appropriately weighted
good-making features with a partial lexical ranking (yielding quite a diverse set of
suﬃcient conditions and ranking of diﬀerent states within the category).
For example, we can take the following four parameters25 for triggering rogue status
and make the criteria of ‘rogueness’ ordered as follows, where the sign ‘>’ indicates the
level of importance of the criterion for ascribing the label: (a) the attempt to develop
weapons of mass destruction > (b) involvement with international terrorism > (c)
posing military threats > (d) challenging international norms. The lexical rankings
would then allow us to be more conﬁdent in assessing and comparing cases where
some, but not all, criteria are satisﬁed. For example, one could deﬁne a rogue state as a
state that meets at least one of the ﬁrst two criteria by order of importance ((a) and (b)
in this case) or, alternatively, satisﬁes any three of them. In the same way, this approach
would also provide for more easily discernible comparisons of ‘rogueness’ levels (e.g.
country X adopting behaviour described by (a), (b), and (c) is ‘roguer’ than country Y
adopting behaviour described by (b), (c), and (d)).
Needless to say, one would have to provide a justiﬁcation for the precise lexical
ordering, one that does not rely on some version of F.P.R. In other words, to retain the
classiﬁcatory approach as normatively distinct, the ranking of the criteria should not be
justiﬁed according to a single value or combined metric. The latter, however, is not
insurmountable. While all versions of F.P.R. can potentially generate a lexical ordering
of criteria, not all lexical orderings of a set of criteria need to rely on a single metric
approach.
To illustrate, the ranking of the four features of ‘rogueness’ we have just suggested
could be developed by citing diﬀerent types of moral considerations such as the
importance of peace and stability in the international system (so that weapons of
mass destruction should not proliferate), the relevance of the principle of non-
combatant immunity (which would disqualify support for terrorism), and the idea of
the general obligation to follow valid legal norms (which would support respect for at
least some international norms). In turn, their ranking could be developed by conduct-
ing pairwise comparisons between diﬀerent ordering using Scanlon’s reasonable reject-
ability contractualist methodology or, alternatively, by relying on the construction of a
suitably deﬁned evaluative standpoint (Scanlon 2000).26
25Here we follow Hoyt (2000) for the content of the parameters and their discussion.
26More broadly, and without delving too much into the suggested solution, the relevant point is that F.P.R.N.
approaches seem to be able to avail themselves of broadly constructivist methodologies to produce a lexical ordering
without necessarily having to accept some form of F.P.R. Rawls’ original position is perhaps the most famous
illustration of the claim that lexical orderings do not require the use of a single metric approach but can still be
determined from a uniﬁed evaluative standpoint.
ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 69
A second option for overcoming, or at least blunting, the completeness problem –
and in particular its most prominent manifestation, the ‘diﬀerent realms case’ – is to
hold that we should simply classify states in area speciﬁc ways and our foreign policy
should be very diﬀerent depending on our type of engagement. We could, for example,
maintain good economic links with those states that respect international treaties and
yet seek to exclude them from a range of multinational bodies if they engage in
domestic suppression. States as such would be evaluated in each ‘realm’ – economic
structures, human rights, domestic political institutions and behaviour, respect for
borders, and so on – and this would deﬁne our relations for a range of interactions
germane to that realm. This is clearly an approach that has been adopted in several
actual foreign policy scenarios, including, most notably, the relationship between Iran
and some of its European commercial partners (at the time of writing – 2016/17).
This – as we note below – is not an option without problems, but it does at least
seem to defuse some of the diﬃculties of completeness (and incidentally reﬂect how
many states try to prevent ‘trade missions’ with non-liberal states from talking about
human rights or border disputes).
The possibilities for overcoming the gradation problem are diﬀerent. Recall that the
gradation problem arose because it is extremely unlikely that any political community
could realistically meet in full the deﬁning features of a given category; more speciﬁ-
cally, that their compliance with a particular requirement is often going to be a matter
of degree rather than a ‘yes/no’ scenario.
Here again it is important to note that the gradation problem relies on a speciﬁc
conceptualization of the nature of the deﬁning features of a given category, namely
being based on thresholds or conditions. Empirically, though, these seem likely to be
often partially met, or met in fragmented ways.
However, a diﬀerent but sympathetic approach would be to take the ‘deﬁning
features’ to represent that of an ideal type to which an instance can be closer or further
away from that based on some sort of family resemblance.27 The conceptual shift seems
to relieve, at least to some degree, the need to view actual existing states as solely
meeting the requirements or not.28
One reasonable objection here would be that considering state classiﬁcations as ideal
types creates a problem of indeterminacy. The basic issue is that if a given category
stands for an ideal type, and as such is not something for which we can simply take its
deﬁning features as conditions for normatively labelling real-world instances, then we
still need to decide the extent to which an object is ‘closer’ or ‘further’ from the ideal
type; that is, how well it has to match the relevant features that deﬁne a category in
order to fall under it. To illustrate, let us assume the category ‘liberal democracy’ is an
ideal type constituted by, say, the following two features: (i) respect for the basic
freedoms that are familiar from the constitutional tradition; and (ii) a system of
governance that embodies political equality by giving each adult citizen one vote, and
by adequately protecting the fair value of the political liberties. The question, then, is to
27This seems to be the approach implictly used by (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995).
28Again, one further intrepretation of Rawls suggested by one of the reviewers was that this might be how LP is best
conceived. If so, one could then start with the subsequent problems, and try in addition to provide an account of how
the LP’s guidance would concretely work in real-world contexts.
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what extent a country can be considered a liberal democracy given that we are prepared
to see the latter category as an ideal type to which no country will perfectly conform.
Our answer is that, without rejecting the whole approach, such sorts of diﬃcult
assessments are probably unavoidable. There simply is no escape from the fact that real-
world classiﬁcations according to ideal types are subject to some degree of judgment
and sometimes will not be clear-cut. However, while unavoidable the problem is not
utterly disabling. To say that a classiﬁcatory exercise is subject to some level of
indeterminacy is not to say that it is groundless.29 The point, rather, is to develop
justiﬁcatory strategies in order to provide reasons for a speciﬁc type of classiﬁcatory
choice. One strategy could be to start from those central cases in which we feel more
conﬁdent about the classiﬁcation. For example, for the ideal type ‘liberal democracy’ as
deﬁned above, one could start from speciﬁc examples – such as the Scandinavian
countries – in order to determine the extent to which the relevant criteria are met by
what we normally consider to be the best case(s) of real-world exempliﬁcation(s) of the
ideal type. One could then move on to examine other countries that are standardly
considered as liberal democracies according to ordinary and historically repeated
political judgements, such as the U.K. and France, in order to compare them to the
cases where we are more conﬁdent and establish if they are suﬃciently similar. The
method could then be reiterated by conducting pairwise comparisons between what are
believed to be the central cases and those that are less clear-cut.
Note also that, so far, we have discussed the conceptual presuppositions of conduct-
ing classiﬁcatory exercises as a static and self-contained task. In other words, the
analysis we have conducted relied on two assumptions: (1) that the objects of classiﬁca-
tion do not change as we are trying to classify them; and (2) that their features cannot
be explained in terms of factors that are outside of their control. Both assumptions can
be challenged. However, weakening them actually allows us to make progress on the
gradation problem by providing a more sophisticated way of structuring our
judgements.
As an example of a challenge to assumption (1), consider the role of intentions.30 Thus
far we have assumed that a state’s ‘intentions’, very broadly understood, are irrelevant to
how we classify them. The assumption is controversial. To illustrate, imagine that you are
trying to classify a moderately autocratic country with a relatively decent human rights
record.31 Does it matter that such country has been (ex-hypothesis) reforming its constitu-
tional structures in the direction of a much more participatory role for its citizens? Many
would be inclined to think that it should. One way to ﬁnd a place for the latter idea is to
make clear that it can aﬀect the way in which we structure our judgments in the context of
the gradation problem. For example, in the context of pairwise comparisons, intentions
may prove to be useful ways of assessing a ‘direction of travel’ that includes various
judgements of what the state is likely to be like subsequently. This might notably also be
29While not in principle disabling from a particular agent’s evaluative standpoint – indeterminacy is, after all, a feature
of much judgement – it does risk conﬂict between diﬀerent agents. On this see section six. The solution we are
suggesting does not however collapse into the gradation problem because instances within a category can be further
from or closer to the ‘boundaries’, with this being aﬀected by partial or fractured compliance.
30For an excellent discussion of this issue see Forster (2014). She uses the idea of ‘aspiration’ to convey the importance
of attitudinal features.
31For a real life example, consider Singapore.
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something that impacts the foreign policy measures, in eﬀect intentions indicating both a
destination and a process that we may wish to buttress (or, if negative, to undermine).
Now consider one way to challenge assumption (2). States are placed in an environment
(international society) that routinely aﬀects their internal make-up and external behaviour.
Some may thus be sceptical that classiﬁcatory exercises can have any meaningful point
unless they also reﬂect the fact that membership in international regimes and organizations
and the wider international context signiﬁcantly aﬀects how states behave both externally
and internally. The latter claims are often seen as central to both liberal and institutionalist
approaches to international relations (Moravcsik 1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999). To
illustrate, compare the proportion of a state’s budget that goes towards defence with that
allocated to the fulﬁlment of basic rights to subsistence. The relative weight of these
expenditures may be aﬀected by both membership in international organizations and the
geopolitical environment in which a country is placed. For example, a state facing repeated
challenges to its territorial integrity by its neighbours may commit more resources to its
defence budget which, in the context of moderate scarcity, may aﬀect its ability to protect
subsistence rights. Should such external constraints aﬀect the way in which we classify the
state in question? Intuitively, many would be inclined to think that it should. What is
relevant, for the purposes of our argument, is that, once again, challenging the assumption
that we can classify states without looking at the context in which they operate is useful in
identifying further sources of input for the gradation judgments. It signals that we should
take into account (as one plausible source of input) the kinds of constraints that interna-
tional society, broadly construed, places on its members.
To summarize: in section four we highlighted how the classiﬁcatory approach to foreign
policy suﬀers from two main problems, that of completeness and of gradation. In section
ﬁve we suggested that categories could be deﬁned by counting principles which are partially
lexically ordered, that they could be realm-speciﬁc, and that the overall classiﬁcations could
be viewed as constituting ideal types closer to or further fromwhich an instance can be. The
use of counting principles to deﬁne categories avoids the rigidity of necessary conditions,
and combining this with some lexical rankings justiﬁed through a broadly constructivist
method ensures we are not (implicitly) collapsing everything to one underlying metric and
thus adopting F.P.R. Making things realm-speciﬁc allows us to tailor our relations by area
and thus to respond to states actingmarkedly diﬀerently in particular realms. Furthermore,
conceiving of the deﬁning features of a category as ideal types potentially allows us to make
judgements of closeness or distance from the category and thus to respond to the fact that
real-world states conform unevenly and partially to most qualitative standards.
New problems: judgment conﬂicts, incentives and ‘schizophrenia’
The aforementioned solutions are, in our view, the obvious ways of making progress in
order to make the state classiﬁcation approach conceptually more defensible and,
speciﬁcally, able to overcome what we have highlighted as its main weaknesses.
Before concluding, however, it’s worth noting a few of the diﬃculties raised by the
very reconceptualization we have put forward. Such diﬃculties pertain to the eﬀective
action-guiding potential of the approach. We believe that any fully speciﬁed account of
state classiﬁcation would ultimately need to overcome (or deny) them. The three
problems we want to highlight are: (a) the problem of conﬂicts of judgment; (b) the
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problem of mixed incentives; and (c) the problem of ‘schizophrenic’ diplomacy. These
problems are raised by, respectively, the use of ideal types, the use of lexical rankings,
and the use of realm-speciﬁc classiﬁcations.
First, consider the problem of conﬂicts of judgment. One of the central moves in
resolving the gradation problem was to conceive of the classiﬁcations as ideal types.
Doing so partly relieved the criteria from having to be fully met in practice. However, as
we noted above, there is likely to be more than one way to then perform the relevant
exercise of deciding whether a speciﬁc state falls under a particular ideal type and they
will, in all likelihood, signiﬁcantly rely on judgment. In this picture, it seems probable
that diﬀerent state actors would be likely to end up with diﬀerent sets of actual
classiﬁcations. While the latter is not a decisive theoretical reason to abandon the use
of ideal types, it at least puts pressure on its action-guiding potential. This is because,
even assuming that all states accept exactly the same state classiﬁcation ideal types (by
itself a very optimistic assumption), merely implementing the approach could still
generate large disagreements.
Second, consider the use of lexical rankings. One key factor that separates our
somewhat reformulated state classiﬁcation from being an instance of F.P.R. is that the
criteria which deﬁne a classiﬁcation can be given a lexical ranking that does not reﬂect
an underlying single metric. However, providing a lexical ordering can also potentially
generate a problem of mixed incentives. In what follows we use the example of what
Rawls calls ‘benevolent absolutisms’ to illustrate concretely both how the lexical ranking
approach could work and why it would generate this diﬃculty.
Recall that Rawls deﬁnes benevolent absolutisms as political communities that
respect human rights and are externally peaceful (1999, 90). One way to operationalize
the lexical ordering approach we have suggested above is to give priority (for the
purposes of the classiﬁcation) to a speciﬁc and easily observable subset of human rights
and to a restricted understanding of external peacefulness. For instance, it could be that
to be considered a benevolent absolutism one would at a minimum have to respect the
borders of one’s neighbours and not be engaged in the mass killing or enslavement of
one’s own people and the violent persecution of religious minorities. In this picture, the
lexical ordering could be justiﬁed by appealing to the centrality of physical integrity for
the basic interests of individuals, and by recalling the importance of territorial integrity
for collective self-determination. In turn, a liberal state’s foreign policy towards a
political community that is classiﬁed as a benevolent absolutism could, say, envisage
full trade and diplomatic relations and a degree of internal non-interference.
The downside of this sort of lexical approach, however, is that it creates the incentive
to make progress on the lexically decisive criteria but to disregard those that aﬀect
where one lies within the category. For example, a state with a small border dispute and
a relatively free press and civil society could as such gain full relations with liberal states
were it to settle the border dispute and crack down on press freedoms, freedom of
association and political dissent (assuming unchanged performance for what concerns
the aforementioned basic human rights). The latter problem is that within the category
of benevolent absolutisms as deﬁned above there would, presumably, be wide variance
in terms of respect for the full array of domestic human rights over and above the
minimal idea that these rights preclude enslavement and mass murder. In the same
way, there would likely be a great deal of practical and conceptual space between
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respecting the territorial integrity of other states and a peaceful foreign policy. This
creates the potential for problematic incentives in situations where minor gains with
respect to a speciﬁc criterion can become more beneﬁcial (for the would-be benevolent
absolutism) than widespread large progress on lexically non-decisive criteria.
Furthermore, the latter problem becomes particularly striking if relations are diﬀer-
ent based on the realm. If interstate economic relations, for instance, are only based on
adherence to a set of international economic norms and standards then there is very
little self-interested incentive for state actors to make progress in other realms such as
human rights, positive political reform or the protection of vulnerable minorities.32
Now perhaps this is all acceptable: we make the key criteria the ones that are most
important. However, state classiﬁcation does seem at a minimum here to need to provide
some reassurance that non-lexically decisive criteria are not implicitly being jettisoned. The
fact that under F.P.R. every major action of a state may aﬀect how they are treated by foreign
liberal states does seem to incentivize progress better than having certain criteria that count in
reaching a threshold of treatment and others that – while judged very important – do not.
This is the problem of lexical rankings and the stark incentives they can create.
Finally, the third diﬃculty accrues to the suggestion that states might be evaluated very
diﬀerently in diﬀerent realms. Someone could, as such, be a close economic ally, for example,
and a security foe due to their support for various insurgent regimes and lack of respect for
international law.33 In principle we might have both a warm trade relationship and decidedly
conﬂictual engagements in international bodies. In practice, however, this seems as though it
would be sometimes too ‘schizophrenic’ to be sustainable: when we engage with states we
usually do so simultaneously in a range of areas, and based on a relatively consistent evaluation
of the state. To be foes in one area and allies in another is theoretically possible, but
presumably practically diﬃcult, and the mixed messages (this is a state we approve of vs.
this is a state we regard as behaving very badly) might be hard to sustain.
Thus at a minimum any state-classiﬁcationism would need to address how one would
maintain a consistent policy stance towards a foreign state if it was an ally in one realm and
a foe in another (or some other strongly conﬂicting categories). States do do this – they can
have strong economic relations even while engaged with each other in signiﬁcant territorial
or value-based disputes. But it does complicate the picture. It also, from the perspective of
the non-liberal state, might produce quite a bit of antipathy even in the areas where there
was strong cooperation: it is hard to be part of a government being strongly condemned by
a foreign power and still to maintain real cooperation and trust in another area. One can
fake it, but that undercuts some of the value of close relations.
The problems we have highlighted so far are not necessarily insuperable. What they
do indicate, however, is that if we want the state classiﬁcation approach to be not only
normatively attractive but also able to provide actual guidance in the real world then
further progress is required. It is one thing to describe some category of polity based on
its deﬁning features – as Rawls’ does – and another to argue for how we should
32Note how under F.P.R., by contrast, these diﬀerent areas are somewhat ‘traded’, so that external recognition and productive
inter-state relations, in principle at least, can be improved bymaking progress in a range of areas. However, if there are lexical
conditions in one area that bestow such relations then the other areas are de-incentivized.
33This type of situation is far from implausible. As noted above, it seems to be a feature of the relationship between
European countries and Iran. For a speciﬁc illustration, think of the relationship between post-revolution Iran with
Germany (see The Jerusalem Post, 28 June 2015). http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Why-Germany-is-the-
weakest-Western-link-in-nuclear-talks-with-Iran-407350.
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structure our relations with those that conform to it. Yet to be of pragmatic import we
need to know how to use this to relate to states that don’t cleanly meet the classiﬁca-
tions, and at the same time we need to do so and try to avoid perverse outcomes, overly
‘schizophrenic’ foreign policy relations and persistent evaluative disagreement.
Concluding remarks
State classiﬁcationism seems to be a widespread empirical practice, and yet both
conceptually and as a type of normative theory it is oddly under-theorized. The aim
of this paper has been to explore whether the approach in general is attractive and
viable, not just whether the detailed and speciﬁc judgements underlying diﬀerent views
about how to classify states are the right ones.
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